Global health has been an unexpected hurdle in the last year, after the COVID-19 pandemic swept across the world. In only a year, scientists working with the World Health Organisation (WHO) have had to rapidly research into this new virus and have been pressured to provide an up-to-date response outline to world leaders. In 100 years, the world has never had to face a threat like this one, and globalisation has made it increasingly difficult to manage. World leaders have chosen their own paths in response to the virus, and there seems to be a lack of consensus about which is the best way to manage this virus. This report will examine the efficiency of the WHO in terms of their pandemic response and explore opposing government responses: The UK and New Zealand.
Were the WHO Ready for a Virus like COVID-19?
By the 31st of December 2019, the WHO could clearly identify a novel coronavirus in Wuhan, China. From then they were watched closely to see how functional pandemic planning was in action, or whether the WHO underestimated how the effects of a rapidly globalising world and increased global transport would spread the pandemic beyond the capabilities of healthcare services across the world, especially the West (Fujita and Hamaguchi, 2016). The WHO kept their plan brief, by acknowledging that not every country is at the same level of preparedness (WHO, 2005), yet fails to provide exact plans for countries with varying levels of preparedness, whether this be due to lack of funding, or generalising that their outline meets the needs of every country.
The failure of the WHO did, however, highlight how each nation had prepared themselves to deal with an outbreak of a virus. There was not a global consensus into how to manage the virus, and therefore there is lots of evidence to examine different response strategies, and additionally help each nation identify how to improve for the next international health crisis.
The WHO as an Authority Figure.
The WHO is a branch of the United Nations, giving it no authority to reprimand it’s member states, even in a pandemic. Not only this, but the WHO is funded tragically, with only $2 billion available to them, as of 2019, which they split into multiple research projects (Buranyi, 2020). While they declared a Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC) on January 30th 2020. Even the WHO themselves accepted that the situation was nothing of concern for a while (Freedman, 2020). The warning system failed (Maxem, 2021). Only towards the end of March did countries, notably the UK, start to act. The UK had 1,198 cases by the time it went into lockdown, on March 23rd 2020 (WHO, 2021), 53 days after the WHOs highest alert, where they advised to implement social distancing measures and identify and isolate cases. It seemed that governments were not panicked enough to make action. The WHO were also indecisive with their publications, suggesting to completely discourage the use of face coverings since they were said to not protect against the virus (Molteni and Rogers, 2020). It was only until July that the WHO decided that face coverings were in fact an extremely powerful mechanism to protect against transmitting the virus (BBC, 2020). With the WHOs inconsistent advice, countries, such as the UK, were reluctant to make them mandatory, representing a distrust in the WHO. In fact, the UK failed to make masks mandatory until 24th July (BBC, 2020).
The WHO and Scientific Discovery
Despite there being a great deal of criticism regarding the WHO, there have been some notable scientific advances through them, especially having only researched this virus for a year. By the 18th March, the WHO had launched an international clinical trial to gather a large amount of reliable data with the aim of developing treatments for Covid-19. These types of trials can take years to design, yet, under pressure, WHO launched theirs in only a matter of months. This study was magnanimous, spanning 30 countries, 500 hospitals and 12,000 patients. It eliminated the possibility of having multiple small studies failing to collect hard evidence. (WHO, 2020). The WHO showed up massively on the research front. By April, there was a vaccine in development (WHO, 2020). Researchers across the world have also been tracking cases of Covid-19, and have found several new variants, notably in South Africa, the UK and Brazil, meaning the WHO are still constantly researching on the evolution of this virus, to work out the implications of another variant, and whether it is resistant to vaccines and medicines that have been launched by large pharmaceutical companies, like Pfizer.
The UK in Crisis - 21 Million Masks Short
The government ignored weeks of evidence that suggested going into lockdown sooner would prevent cases and deaths from spiking to extremes. Many of Britain’s citizens were shocked at the inactivity of government to provide any sort of response for three months. While the UK government seemed to act passively toward the situation, they opted for herd immunity. Their plans were to allow 60% of the British public to be infected (Aschwanden, 2020), and therefore, achieve herd immunity, despite the government being aware that this disease could cost lives (Figure 1). Towards the beginning of March, advice was rolled out, like ‘work from home’ and ‘avoid social venues’, but this advice was vague, and not enforced. It was only until studies released on 16th March suggested that the amount of people who will need hospital treatment with COVID-19 exceeds the capacity of the National Health Service (NHS) that the government finally decided to act, closing schools, and launching Britain into it’s first national lockdown (Hunter, 2020). In truth, the efficiency of Britain’s pandemic response began before COVID-19 emerged. The 2009 procurement list for stockpiling PPE was 21 million items of personal protective equipment (PPE) short, and the NHS service was already millions short of enough ventilators (BBC, 2020). The NHS have been first responders throughout the pandemic, handling distressing scenes, and working almost non-stop for months. Even before the pandemic hit, the 2019 NHS Survey declared that NHS workers were already working 1.1million hours of unpaid overtime per week, and 40% report being unwell due to work related stress (Ashworth, 2020). Britain’s front-line were unprepared for a pandemic, and with wavering government support, the NHS were never at risk of being overwhelmed, they already were.
Figure 1: Two graphs, 1a showing COVID-19 cases in the UK from 2nd February 2020 to 29th July 2020. 1b showing COVID-19 deaths in the UK from 2nd February 2020 to 29th July 2020 (UK Government, 2021).
The UK, are still getting it wrong. They have bounced in and out of lockdowns, and the public are losing faith. The statistics prove that lockdowns in the UK do, in fact, work (Figure 2), but they are being released too soon. A consistent failure to close borders, and failure to complete lockdown until it is safe will cost the UK further, even with herd immunity through mass vaccination.
Figure Two: A graph which shows the Number of COVID-19 cases in the UK. The red arrows represent to beginning of a lockdown. The graph represents how lockdowns in the UK have worked to limit the spread of COVID-19 in the UK, yet not completely stop it (UK Government, 2021).
The Lessons to Learn from New Zealand
New Zealand and the United Kingdom took opposite approaches in response. To look statistically, the UK have had 6,270.4 COVID-19 cases per 100,000 people (UK Government, 2021), while New Zealand have had 48.5 cases per 100,000 people (Worldometer, 2021) (figure 3), a stark comparison. New Zealand managed to keep their cases so low through an elimination strategy (Figure 4). New Zealand began rolling out their pandemic response plan in early January, before COVID-19 arrived in the country, giving them a wide timeframe to finetune the plan to mirror the ongoing scientific knowledge and ever-changing advice from the World Health Organisation. Since the beginning, New Zealand had taken an elimination strategy, after prime minister Jacinda Ardern confessed that their national health service could not cope with a big outbreak, like the UK (The Guardian, 2020). The leadership in New Zealand proved that there is a need for anticipatory leadership (Mazey and Richardson, 2020), and to plan and act prior to the event, rather than hesitating until it becomes unfixable.
Figure 3: A graph comparing COVID-19 cases between the United Kingdom and New Zealand over a year, starting in March 2020.
Figure 4 shows a selection of pandemic response strategies, in which governments have chosen. The UK have chosen the mitigation/suppression strategy, as characterised by multiple extremely high peaks, and multiple sustained lockdown periods. New Zealand have largely taken the elimination approach, by sustaining a strict lockdown period, but when released, life can return to a relatively normal state. They eliminate the transmission of the virus (Baker et al, 2020).
The Plan – New Zealand’s Strategy Explained.
Firstly, New Zealand, like the UK, needed a trustworthy leadership, which the UK did not achieve through various breaches of their own laws (Weaver, 2020). Prime minister Jacinda Ardern’s press conferences included much of the personal pronoun ‘us’, making sure her population knew the response to COVID-19 was more than her response, but everyone’s response collectively (Mazey and Richardson, 2020).
In terms of response strategy, between February and May of 2020, the Government of New Zealand implemented a nationwide intervention, with a four-level model of restrictions: level one labelled ‘prepare’ and level four labelled ‘lockdown’ (New Zealand Government, 2020). They also implemented early border closures, social distancing measures and stay at home orders, as well as widespread testing and an effective track and trace system, all of which have kept New Zealand’s cases (figure 5) controlled.
All of these factors, particularly the vigilant lockdown measures meant that New Zealand was COVID-19 free by late July for over 80 days, which shows evidence that their elimination of transmission process was effective. The only cases beyond that point have been caused by border control failures, however, each entry into the country requires a 14-day quarantine period, and so imported cases are effectively managed.
Figure 5: A graph which shows case numbers in New Zealand since February 2020 (Ministry of Health NZ, 2021).
Overall, from looking at the response from New Zealand regarding COVID-19, it is apparent a quick-acting and hard response was necessary to combat this virus, yet it highlighted clear gaps in its healthcare system, which they were aware of. They acted accordingly to what their health service could take, and took a cautionary approach, which, for future global health crises, a lot of countries will take as an example.
Conclusion
In conclusion, while analysis of such a recent and ongoing topic can be difficult, due to a lack of reliable sources, it is clear that there are many stark contrasts in responses across the globe, since the WHO could not meet their hopeful global consensus of response. The UK and New Zealand’s story began similarly, with a less than necessary capacity of their public health services, yet they took opposing approaches. The UK acted slow, and disorganised. They underestimated the impact of COVID-19, and acted according to their misinterpretations. On the other hand, New Zealand provided a star example to the rest of the West about how to manage a pandemic. They responded fast, and despite the little information on COVID-19 then, they acted with caution and put the health of their population first. When analysing responses, it can be concluded that preparation is vital for a future global health crisis, and this can include a strong trustworthy government and a supported public health service. With globalisation, elimination of transmission of a virus is the optimal strategic response.
References
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[this is an assignment that I submitted to my university. this is not an academic resource]
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